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BOOK REVIEWS
Treatise on the Conflict of Laws. By ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG. St. Paul:
West Publishing Company, 1962. Pp. li, 824. l10.00.
The method of legal thought is undergoing a change. The Conceptual
Jurisprudence, which was dominant around the turn of the century, is
yielding place to that new method which is varyingly called jurisprudence
of interests, sociological jurisprudence, jurisprudence of reason, the
Grand Style, or simply, realism. The movement started simultaneously,
but without conscious connection, in Germany, the United States and
the Scandinavian countries. It has spread to France, where it had already
received an earlier impetus through Francois Gtny. It has now reached
Italy, Spain and even England. Everywhere the method of formal
rationality, as it has been called by Max Weber, is changing into a
modern method of substantive rationality, one in which legal problems
are solved no longer by an allegedly value-blind derivation of answers
from more or less broadly defined formal concepts, but by the conscious
application and evaluation of social policies and their balancing against
each other.
Conceptual jurisprudence, which permeated all fields of the law, found
its most consistent application in the law of conflict of laws, especially
in that branch known as choice of law.' Whether a problem in the law of
contract or tort was to be decided under the law of state X or Y was
determined by broad rules, such as those requiring the application of the
law of the place of contracting or the place of the wrong. These rules
were widely conceived as being derived by logical necessity from postu-
lates such as that a right vested in one state must be protected every-
where, and that the vesting of a right can be produced exclusively by the
sovereign of the place of the person, the thing or the act in question.
Formulae as conceptual as this vested rights-territoriality theory of Dicey
1 Choice of law is, of course, only one of the three branches commonly regarded in
the United States as constituting the field of law of conflict of laws. The other two
branches are the law concerning judicial jurisdiction of states, and the law concerning
the effects of foreign judgments and other foreign governmental acts. These latter two
branches were already treated by Ehrenzweig in a book published in 1959 and which
was to be followed by a second volume devoted to choice of law. Ehrenzweig has now
chosen to combine into one volume a condensed revision of the 298 pages of the older
book with the new part on choice of law. As I have already reviewed that book,
8 J. Pu. L. 551 (1959), I shall limit the present review to the new part on choice of
law, which now occupies pages 307-679. To present so vast and complex a field in
372 pages, and to do so in a highly original fashion, is in itself a remarkable achieve-
ment.
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and Beale could also be found in continental countries. They have been
abandoned there, just as in this country, even though traces linger on in a
good many courts.
For a generation the efforts of the leading scholars in the field were
directed to the refutation and destruction of the theoretical structure of
Beale and his Restatement. That work was done so effectively that con-
flicts law finally came to be a heap of ruins. What design should
guide the construction of the new building that would correspond to the
new method of jurisprudence of interests? Several architects have pro-
posed, in varying, more or less radical, formulations to renounce, at least
for the moment, all efforts to find guiding principles, and to choose, in
each individual case, that state's law which would yield the "better result"
in terms of policies and preferences of the forum. Under another view,
propounded and consecutively refined by Brainerd Currie, and more
recently also adumbrated by David Cavers, conflicts law is concerned with
the demarcation of the regulatory spheres of sovereign states. In the
absence of a power superior to the several sovereigns concerned, each
sovereign should apply its own regulations, except when another sovereign
has a strong interest which, for reasons of friendliness, the forum wishes
to accommodate.
Another new design is now supplied by Ehrenzweig, who, first among
American rebuilders, presents both a general sketch and a detailed new
structure encompassing in detail the entire field of conflicts law. This
new structure is impressive, and its details are worked out with admirable
care. While many will criticize, nobody can deny that Ehrenzweig has
approached his immense task with a refreshing open-mindedness and a
stupendous range of learning. Ehrenzweig draws on the history of the
field from its continental beginnings in 12th century Italy, and he is at
home in the vast modern literature of English and other languages,
including Scandinavian and Slavic. American and British case law is
fully covered. The reader will, indeed, find references to a large number
of cases which have never been cited in any other treatise. More impor-
tant, the cases are scrutinized so that one can, for the first time, dis-
tinguish between those in which the courts had to choose between two
or more laws yielding different results, and those in which it made no
practical difference which law would be applied. It constitutes a major
discovery that a large number of cases which have so far figured as lead-
ing authorities, and are used to prove one or another of the various
competing conceptualist theories, belong to the category of dictum.
Ehrenzweig does not waste time and space on a theoretical refutation
of the old Beale approach. He regards it as dead. But he points out, per-
haps all too often, what inadequate and uncertain consequences follow
from that approach. No time is wasted to refute either the neo-realist
approach or Currie's view of conflicts law as a law deciding which of
competing sovereigns shall prevail. For Ehrenzweig, conflicts law is a
part of private rather than of constitutional or international law. Only
by coincidence does Ebrenzweig agree with Currie that decision under
the law of the forum ought to constitute the general norm even in
cases presenting foreign elements. According to Ehrenzweig, foreign law
ought to be resorted to only where its application is indicated by some
rule which is established with unmistakable clarity by statute or firm
judicial practice, or where decision under foreign law is required by
some reason of strong and important policy of the forum. The existence
and the scope of such policies cannot be determined by any broad
theories of comprehensive application, but only by analysis of each
narrow situation.2
As indicated, Ehrenzweig's system dictates that decision under the
lex fori should be the normal, even though not necessarily the most fre-
quent, law applicable to cases with foreign contacts. Naturally the
reader wishes to know why this should be so. But he does not receive an
adequate answer to that question. The lex fori rule is presented as an
axiom, which Ehrenzweig attempts to show was adhered to in fact when
conflicts law had not yet been confused by formalistic-conceptual rea-
soning. But history may be read in many ways. It might be seen as
indicating the insufficiency of a strict adherence to the lex fori rule, as
well as offering proof of the inadequacy of Ehrenzweig's ideal, where
choice of law is fully replaced by choice of jurisdiction, so that no court
would ever have to decide a case for which its own law would not be the
"proper" one. The United States especially is far removed from this
latter position. That it would be untenable is demonstrated by the
English experience. 3 Indeed, for centuries English common law courts
refused to decide cases requiring the ascertainment of foreign facts,
especially those facts alleged to give rise, had they occurred in England,
to an action in the inchoate law of contracts. Where what we would
nowadays call the conclusion of a contract was alleged to have occurred
2 This method is, of course, of that same jurisprudence of interests that is making
its way in all fields of the law. In conflicts law it has the special advantage of
eliminating those "pseudo-problems" of renvoi, characterization, preliminary question
and public policy, which, as Ehrenzweig shows, the conceptualists had to develop
as correctives to which one could resort when the results of the overly general basic
rules appeared too unjust.
Practitioners will be grateful to Ehrenzweig for thus freeing them from refinements
which they have never understood. The elimination of these refinements constitutes a
welcome simplification of conflicts law.
3 See Sack, Conflict of Laws in the History of the English Law, in 3 LAw: A CENTURy
OF PROGREss 342 (1937).
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outside of England, it was not possible to assemble a jury from the
vicinage and thus proceed in a common law court. Jurisdiction by these
courts was indeed not necessary, because cases with foreign contacts were
satisfactorily handled in the courts merchant, the Court of Admiralty
or the Council, all of which applied a law merchant or a law of the seas
with worldwide uniformity. Difficulties arose only when, in the 17th cen-
tury, these courts were merged in the common law courts. The refusal of
the latter to take cognizance of cases with foreign facts would have re-
sulted in a denial of justice in all cases in which a foreign forum was not
available or not easily accessible. This situation was remedied by the
common law courts' refusal to allow a defendant to deny a plaintiff's
allegation that such places as Honfleur, Hamburg or Calcutta were
situated in England. The court could then decide the case under the
English common law.
It was the very injustice of this indiscriminate application of the
lex fori which induced Lord Mansfield and his successors to employ the
technique, developed several centuries earlier on the continent, of tak-
ing a foreign law as the rule of decision, that is, the technique of choice
of law. That technique asks under what circumstances a court should
look to a foreign law rather than its own. That question cannot be
satisfactorily answered unless we are aware of the reasons why we regard
decision under the lex fori as unsatisfactory in certain cases. Ehrenzweig
does not offer us an answer to this question.
For centuries scholars sought to answer that question by reference
to the territorial ilature of sovereignty. It appeared as self-evident that
each sovereign had the power to regulate conduct carried on within his
own territory. The question asked was to what extent, if any, the
sovereign's power of regulation should be given "extra-territorial effect."
Such an allocation of sovereign spheres presupposed the existence of a
legal order superior to all territorial sovereigns. Unfortunately, no rules
allocating sovereignty could be found in any of those legal systems which
at one time or another were indeed superior, or believed to be superior,
to the several territorial sovereigns, such as the Roman Law, Inter-
national Law, Anglo-American Common Law, or the Constitution of the
United States. A great deal of the trouble of traditional conflicts law
stemmed from this futile search for rules of jurisdiction allocation in
legal systems in which such rules were not contained.
It was not until recently that the futility of such a "unitary" approach
was recognized on the continent. Much of the present difficulties of
American conflicts law stems from the continuation of the futile search
to find superior jurisdiction allocation rules in the Constitution of the
United States, although it has also been recognized in this country that
conflicts law is not superior to territorial law-i.e., in the American
context, state law. Although this fact has been eloquently expressed by
commentators and the United States Supreme Court,4 the proper conclu-
sions have not yet been drawn. The reason for this failure seems to lie
in the ambiguity of the term "law."
Ordinarily we think of law as a complex of rules and principles
regulating human conduct. We distinguish law from such other norms of
human conduct as morals, religion and social convention by indicating
its connection with the state. Law thus appears as that complex of norms
which emanates from the state or, in a more refined form, as those norms
to which compliance is enforced by the state. Law is, as John Austin
defined it, the command of the sovereign, or, as we should prefer to say,
the command that is enforced by the sovereign.
If we look upon law in that way it is but natural to regard as possible
the existence of conflicts of laws and to look for rules by which such
conflicts are adjusted. But this definition of the rules of law as rules of
human conduct, that is, as rules addressed by the sovereign to individuals,
is not the only one possible. We can just as well say that the rules of law
are commands to certain officers of the state, telling them under what
circumstances they ought to go into action against individuals by seizing
their property, depriving them of life or liberty, or subjecting them to
other detriments. In our society, where sheriffs, prison wardens, police-
men and other enforcement officers are not to act against anyone without
being ordered or authorized to do so by a court, we could then say that
the law is that complex of rules which tells the judges under what
circumstances they ought to order or authorize enforcement officers to
act. Addressees of the law are, in this view, the judges rather than the
individuals. The rules of law are what they are called in the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, section 34, "rules of decision" rather than "rules of
conduct." 5
Certainly the two definitions do not mutually contradict each other.
Knowing thaf under certain circumstances officials will be authorized to
act against us, we are inclined to arrange our conduct so as to avoid that
unpleasant consequence or, vice versa, so as to make sure that the con-
sequences will take place against another if he should fail to conduct
himself as we wish him to. The rules which appear to be primarily
addressed to the judges as rules of decision thus appear to be indirectly
addressed to the individuals as rules of conduct. Ordinarily it makes no
4 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1940); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S.
498 (1940).
5 Now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).
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difference whether we look upon the law one way or the other. But it
does make a difference when we are concerned with choice of law.
If we look upon law as a set of rules of conduct, we are necessarily
driven to the search for rules limiting the conflicting commands of
different sovereigns. In the absence of a super-sovereign, such rules do not
exist. But if we look upon law as rules of judicial decision, the need for
such a search loses all meaning. There is no compulsion to accommodate
the conflicting demands, and each court is free to give full cognizance to
the most important conflict of laws concern-the parties' expectations.
Each court's rules of decision are, of course, those of its own sovereign.
An Illinois court is expected to decide under Illinois law, and a French
court under French law. We can supplement this statement by observing
that on July 11, 1964, an Illinois court is to decide under the Illinois
law as it stands on July 11, 1964.
But let us assume that on July 11, 1964, Illinois law would provide,
what in fact it does not, that a contract of sale shall not be valid unless
it be made under seal, that a contract was made on July 11, 1960, that
at that time a sale did not require a seal, and that, on July 11, 1964, the
defendant in the Illinois court pleads the new law which went into effect
on January 1, 1963. We shall all regard it as self-evident that the
Illinois court will not apply the new statute. This is so because when they
acted in 1960, the parties were looking to the law as it stood then. If the
court in 1964 decided their case by the decisional rule of 1964 rather
than by that of 1960, the parties would be taken by surprise. The
promisee's expectation, that in case of non-performance the court would
authorize the sheriff to go into action against the promisor, would be
disappointed. Transactions made by the promisee on the basis of that
expectation may be upset. If such disappointment of expectations were
frequent, our credit economy would be seriously disturbed. Even in non-
economic matters, such as marriage, decisions under a retroactive law
would appear to us to be "unjust." Non-retroactivity of new rules of
substantive private law has thus become the generally accepted principle
in all modern legal systems.
Choice-of-law has exactly the same policy ground: avoidance of the
injustice that would result if a controversy were decided under a law
unfamiliar to the parties. Adjustment of one's behavior to norms of
possible judicial decision is not difficult for a person who lives, acts and
owns property in only one jurisdiction. It can be troublesome for one
whose activities range beyond the territorial limits of one judicial
hierarchy. The situation will be serious if the several sets of rules are
incompatible or contradictory. At the present state of world organization
these difficulties and troubles cannot be eliminated. But all countries of
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modem civilization have adopted policies designed to alleviate and
mitigate them. Each country or state has developed a special set of
norms of decision for this purpose and it is exactly these sets of special
norms of decision which constitute what has come to be known as the
"law of conflict of laws" or "private international law." These norms
are as much a part of each state's own law as all the state's other norms of
decision; they are, if we use a convenient short-hand name, part of the
lex fori. The reason each country or state has found it appropriate to
develop such special norms of conflicts law as part of its own law is
simply the desire to facilitate individual life where courts of different
jurisdictions follow different, or potentially different, norms of decision.
The establishment of a minimum measure of predictability in a society
of credit, investment and individual planning has been a principal
motive for the policies which states or countries pursue when they
develop norms of conflicts law.
Since the decisional norms of conflicts law are as much state law as all
other norms of decision, differences from state to state will be inevitable.
Law framers may hold different views as to what constitutes that
minimum of predictability for the sake of which the decision norms of
conflicts law should be designed. Views may differ as to which person's
desire for prediction deserves preference in situations in which several
persons of diverging expectations participate. Frequently, norms of deci-
sion are primarily intended to determine behavior, and only incidentally
to protect individual parties' expectations. Also, conflicts rules may be
consciously shaped so as to facilitate a harmonious co-existence of states
pursuing potentially different policies of .behavior. Conceivably an
occasional conflicts rule may be shaped to help another state effectuate a
policy of its own or to avoid the possible unfriendliness that might result
by helping individuals evade the norms of behavior laid down by an-
other state. The policies pursued in the shaping of conflicts rules may
thus be manifold, but the primary policy, indeed the very raison d'etre
of conflicts law, is the policy of mitigating for individuals the incon-
veniences and problems that can arise through the actual or potential
conflict of differing states' norms of judicial decision. The most impor-
tant need for every framer of rules of conflicts law, be he a legislator, a
judge, or a scholar, is never to lose sight of this fact. He will do so if he
allows himself to be influenced by the idea that conflicts law should
define the spheres where different states may regulate conduct. When a
political unit superior to those whose legislative jurisdictions are to be
demarcated exists, such a task may fall to conflicts law. But an attempt
by the states to build a system of conflicts law on the demarcation of
state spheres of legislative jurisdiction is doomed to failure, for no state
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is bound to abide by efforts of any other state. Such unreality will lead to
the defeatist attitude of a Brainerd Currie, with its predominance of
lex fori and disregard of the need to help individuals adjust themselves
to diverging norms of decision.
It is to Ehrenzweig's credit that he is taking the local law theory
seriously, and that he draws from it all those conclusions which require
the shedding of notions which make no sense outside a system of supra-
state allocation of legislative jurisdiction. Contracts, torts or other human
situations are no longer "governed" by any particular law. Gone are
vested rights, territoriality and its counter-part extraterritoriality of law;
gone are the "pseudo-problems" of renvoi, characterization, etc. Con-
flicts law has been divested of its mystery; it is treated like any other
branch of state law by which certain policies are sought to be achieved.
But Ehrenzweig does not state the policies with full clarity because he
fails to break cleanly with the approach which views norms of law as
norms of behavior rather than norms of decision.
Another of Ehrenzweig's merits is that he discards lump sum thinking
and scrutinizes particular situations. That not everybody will agree with
all the results is natural. My own doubts shall be stated here with respect
to two major issues: Ehrenzweig's advocacy of the rule of validation as
to contracts and marriages, and his preference for the lex fori in the field
of torts.
The rule of validation means that among several laws conceivably
proper to determine the validity of a contract or a marriage, preference
should generally be given to the law validating the contract or marriage.
In attempting to evaluate this position one must remember that in the
field of contracts Ehrenzweig expressly exempts the entire group of
contracts of adhesion from the rule of validation, that is, those contracts
in which free bargaining is practically absent. For these contracts Ehrenz-
weig emphasizes the need of protecting the "adherent" against the abuse
of predominant power.6 Ehrenzveig justifies the rule of validation in
two ways. Analysis of the case law is said to prove that the rule has
actually been applied by the courts, even though this fact has been
hidden behind the varying formalistic formulae of traditional con-
flicts law. This practice is said to have its basis in the courts' universal
eagerness to apply the law chosen by the parties, an eagerness which
Ehrenzweig also believes to discover behind the opinions themselves. If
the autonomy of the parties is to be honored, the rule of validation is
said to follow with necessity, because contracting parties naturally wish
their contract to be valid.
Assuming that Ehrenzweig's reading of the cases is correct, the rule of
6 P. 454.
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validation would of course be one of those firmly established rules of
conflicts law that would have to be followed in the future irrespective of
the value of the underlying policy. Perhaps Ehrenzweig's advocacy of the
rule derives only from this desire to maintain existing tradition-indeed
a meritorious concern. But he also appears to regard the rule of valida-
tion as the expression of desirable policy. Here, I must voice my doubt.
Adhesion contracts do not monopolize unfairness in contract law.
Rules on formality or consideration not only defeat serious and unobjec-
tionable bargains, but also can be used to avoid the enforcement of
unfair bargains. American courts, lacking a developed doctrine of
economic duress, have been particularly deft in their resort to such
"formalistic" devices. 7 If an unfair deal has contacts with more than one
state and can be defeated under the law of one of them, why should a
general rule of validity induce the court to enforce it?
The rule of validity in the field of marriage appears even less desirable.
Ehrenzweig properly connects it with that favor matrimonii which has
so long permeated our law of marriage. The tendency of courts to decide
in favor of validity of a contested marriage whenever possible had three
causes: the sacramental nature of marriage, the desire to prevent the
bastardization of children, and the desire to prevent sexual relations from
retroactively being stamped as sinful. Today, retroactive bastardization of
children can be almost universally prevented by statutes bestowing
legitimacy on children of invalid marriages. Also, prevention of retro-
active sin and protection of the sacramental character of marriage are
religious considerations having no place in secular law. They have not
even been carried out consistently in Canon Law, where, as in secular
laws in which a divorce can be obtained not at all or only with great
difficulty, annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage have tradi-
tionally been used as substitutes. Shall the escape hatch from an unhappy
marriage be closed whenever a marriage having contacts with more than
one law is valid under one and invalid or voidable under another? Why
should conflicts law drive courts into a position in which they would have
to be more Popish than the Pope?
Resort to the favor matrimonii may indeed be justified to correct
injustice in cases where, for instance, the invalidity of marriage is raised
as a defense to a suit for support, or in a dispute between a decedent's
relatives and a person claiming to be the surviving spouse or the legiti-
mate issue. But as a general rule it hardly fits into a time when people
expect judicial relief from an unhappy marriage even in the teeth of a
rigid divorce law. Ehrenzweig himself states that in cases of successive
7 See VON HIPPEL, DIE KONTROLLE DER VERTRAGSFREIHEIT NACH ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHEM
REcHT (1963).
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marriages the favor matrimonii usually is, and ought to be, applied in
favor of the last marriage. This attitude is certainly justified when the
last marriage is attacked as bigamous by a third party. But should it also
apply whenever a spouse to that marriage seeks to escape from it, for a
reason which appears to be "good" even though it may not be recognized
in the forum's official law of divorce? Ehrenzweig's treatment of marriage
justifies his concern, manifest elsewhere in his work, lest overly broad
general rules break down when scrutinized in particular situations.
In the field of torts, Ehrenzweig differentiates between two great
groups: intentional torts and accidental torts. Ehrenzweig sees no reason
to except the latter from his general rule of the lex fori. He recognizes
that this rule contains an invitation for plaintiffs to shop for the forum
with the most favorable law. The corrective, he hopes, will be found
in the doctrine of forum non conveniens. It is hard to share this hope in a
country where cooperation between aggressive lawyers, "generous" juries
and a friendly bench has been by no means rare. Ehrenzweig recognizes
that a rule of the lex fori unrestricted by new rules on proper forum
subjects manufacturers and transport enterprises of nationwide activity
to the law of that state whose law is the most favorable to accident vic-
tims, and that, consequently, premiums of liability insurance of such
enterprises will be set in accordance with that law. He seems to be ready
to accept that result, which, of course, means higher prices for consumers
and customers. But does it not seem rather more desirable to increase
the predictability by which manufacturers and transportation enterprises
could estimate their potential liability, by regular resort to the law of
one place?
While in the field of torts the wide scope given by Ehrenzweig to the
le fori rule should be subjected to renewed consideration, it is arguable
that in contracts the scope of the lex fori might be expanded. As stated
above, a general rule of validity is of doubtful desirability. However,
Ehrenzweig is correct in establishing a basic rule giving recognition to
the parties' own choice of law. Ehrenzweig convincingly shows that there
is no reason why the parties' choice should be limited to the laws of
those jurisdictions with which the contract has factual contacts. Ehrenz-
weig, however, seems to accept the rule of party autonomy simply because
he regards it as the rule followed universally, or almost universally, by
courts all over the world. To myself, the rule of party autonomy illus-
trates the very reason for the existence of a conflicts law. The rule of
party autonomy is required just because decision under the lex fori
would catch the parties by surprise when they had implicitly or expressly
agreed upon resolution of possible controversies under some other law.
To solve the problem of unexpressed intent, scholars and judges must
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elaborate in detail the situations in which parties can be assumed to
have contemplated a certain law. However, if the facts indicate that
parties contracted with each other without having before their minds any
particular law, no expectations will be disappointed if the dispute is
decided under the forum's rules of law, with which the court is, of
course, most familiar. Cases are conceivable, of course, in which the lex
fori might be too alien to be applied to the contract without surprises.
Analysis of these situations is one of the many tasks ahead for a con-
flicts law built, in the manner of Ehrenzweig, not upon untenable
formalistic theories, but upon a systematic evaluation of the real interests
at stake in particular litigation.
MAX RHEINSTEIN*
Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, The University of Chicago.
Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States: An Empirical In-
quiry. By H. G. LEwIs. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1963, Pp. xvii, 308. $7.50.
How have labor unions affected the pattern of wage rates in the
American economy? Professor Lewis's book, Unionism and Relative
Wages in the United States (hereafter Unionism) is a response to that
query. Unionism is a weighty, scholarly, and meticulous work. But, like
most virtuous things, it is dull. Professor Lewis never concocts stylized
facts, nor does he choose to speculate on implications of his findings for
broader reaches of economic theory. This is, of course, a perfectly legiti-
mate, indeed, a commendable choice. But the upshot is that while a
judicious, statistically-trained reader will profit greatly from the book, a
reader ignorant of statistics will not. Surely, professional economists will
both praise Unionism and much benefit from Professor Lewis's highly
skilled processing of mountains of data; he attempted and successfully
discharged an extraordinarily intricate and backbreaking task.
I.
Before I can conscientiously set forth 'the book's findings to readers of
the Law Review who are untrained in statistics, I must offer more song
and dance. The problem that Professor Lewis faced is that he cannot
conduct a controlled experiment: he must attempt to infer effects of
unionism from indirect evidence. By way of simple analogy, consider an
hypothesis that rats thrive better on an all banana diet. An ordinary
experimenter will randomly allocate a pack of rats between an experi-
